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The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in part 
that "Congress shall make no law • abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press .. 1 The right to communicate free of governmental 
intervention is essential to the maintenance of a free and democratic 
society. Throughout history, freedom of speech and the press has been 
recognized as the foundation on which all other Constitutional liberties 
rest. ·In delivering the opinion of the Court in Palko~ Connecticut, 2 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated that freedom of speech" ••• is the 
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of free-
d .. 3 om. 
The very essence of the First Amendment's speech and press clause 
prohibits any governmental control over the communications media except 
in narrowly limited circumstances, which have traditionally been deter-
mined by the courts. Unfortunately, current governmental restraints im-
posed on the cable television industry depart from this fundamental pro-
vision. Those who have chosen to communicate by cable television have 
been unconstitutionally burdened by layer upon layer of local, state and 
federal regulation. 
Cable television is simply a different type of technology that 
utilizes both words and pictures to communicate, much the same way as 
other communications media do. 4 Thus, the fact stands to reason that it 
1 
2 
should be granted the same constitutional protection that is awarded to 
other forms of speech and press. According to legal expert ~hilip Kur-
land, "Cable television is nothing other than the communication from a 
willing speaker to a willing listener •••• It requires no more, and 
perhaps less, regulation for the protection of health, safety and wel-
fare of the citizenry than do newspapers, radio, books, movies or broad-
cast television."5 
Statement of the Problem 
Many of the restraints imposed on the cable television industry 
exceed the bounds established by the First Amendment for permissible 
government intervention. The underlying thesis of this paper is that 
cable operators are being stripped of the liberty to perform the same 
functions that First Amendment principles always have been held to pro-
tect: the right to speak and communicate freely through all available 
mediums of expression. The cable television industry must be allowed to 
communicate free of governmental intervention if the indispensable, dem-
ocratic freedoms of the the First Amendment are to prevail. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the governmental restraints 
imposed on the cable television industry in view of the First Amendment. 
Specifically, this study will focus on those restraints which pose Con-
stitutional challenges to cable regulation in the areas of content, ac-
cess and franchising. The restraints will be constitutionally challenged 
on the basis of their imposition and according to the power and proprie-
ty of the federal, state and local governments to enforce them. 
3 
Significance of the Study 
The First Amendment was designed to protect all forms of communica-
tion from government interference. This protection has become even more 
paramount as new technological advancements rapidly increase the communi-
cative abilities of various media. Although cable television is a rela-
tively new technology, it promises to be one of the most influential in 
days to come if it is allowed to develop free of governmental restraints. 
The significance of this study is the provision of awareness. The 
nation's communications media is suffering from a tremendous loss of 
freedom by allowing the government to excessively control the cable in-
dustry. Hopefully, this flagrant compromise of First Amendment principles 
will be rectified in the near future. Cable operators have their own 
contributions to make in the "marketplace of ideas." Judge Learned Hand 
observes the importance of a "free" interchange of opinions and informa-
tion: 
Vital to all general interests is the dissemination of news 
from as many different sources, and with as many different 
facets and colors as is possible. That interest is closely 
akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest pro-
tected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right con-
clusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of 
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. 6 
Although Judge Hand's observation focuses primarily on the news, the 
entertainment function of cable systems is no less threatened by unwar-
ranted regulation. According to author Philip Kurland, entertainment "is 
no less a necessity for human development. The lessons of life are to be 
found in fiction no less than in fact." 7 Clearly, the principles of the 
First Amendment will be better served if cable television regulation is 
4 
left to the competition of the marketplace rather than a handful of fed-
eral, state and local government officials. 
A Brief History of Cable Television Regulation 
The first cable television systems began operating in the late 
1940s and early 1950s as a means o~ providing television signals to com-
. ti h 1 1 i . t. . 13 mun1 es w ere norma te ev s1on recep 10n was poor or nonex1stent. In 
many areas, television signals could only be received from antennae 
mounted on high towers or located on nearby hilltops. 9 Persons not liv-
ing in elevated areas, or without access to tall towers for receiving 
antennae, were unable to receive television signals. Sensing the demand 
for adequate television service, early cable operators began to build 
antennae at favorable locations and installed cables to carry the sig-
nals throughout their communities. For a fee, any subscriber could get 
their television set connected to the cable. 
Although early cable systems had limited channel capacity and were 
able to provide their subscribers with the signals of relatively few 
television stations, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed 
a freeze from 1948 to 1952 on broadcast television stations and created 
10 an even greater demand for cable television. During this time, while 
the FCC was deciding how the station frequencies should be allocated, 
the inception of new television stations was prohibited. The only way 
for people to receive television if they were not within the broadcast 
path of one of the 108 stations already transmitting over-the-air was to 
install an antenna and "catch the signals as they were flying through 
h . ,.11 t e a1r. 
5 
During the decade of the 1950s, cable television became more sophis-
ticated and, in addition to importing signals into areas where there was 
no television, began distant signal importation into areas where there 
1 . 1 1 . . 12 was ~tt e te ev~s~on. Subsequently, this development brought about 
the first objections to cable television. Existing broadcast stations 
began to experience reductions in their viewing audiences due to the 
importation of distant signals. A.s a result, these local stations were 
no longer able to sell their advertisements for as high a price as they 
had before the importation. A.lthough some of the stations in areas af-
fected by cable television appealed to Congress and the FCC to help them 
in their plight, it was 1958 before any government regulation was final-
ly initiated. 
On May 22, 1958, the FCC made its first inquiry into the regulation 
of cable television and concluded that it could find "no present basis" 
for asserting jurisdiction or authority over cable television systems. 13 
In the same proceeding, the FCC also considered the regulatory implica-
tions of the fact that it had previously just began licensing communica-
tion common carriers to relay television signals via microwave to cable 
television systems. Microwave enabled cable systems to provide their sub-
scribers with numerous signals, including those signals from major metro-
14 politan areas which could not be received over-the-air. Because the 
use of microwave facilities required a license from the FCC, television 
interest groups insisted that the FCC uphold the authority to regulate 
the number of signals and the manner of carriage of cable television 
systems based on the public interest determination required of the FCC 
prior to the issuance of all radio licenses. 15 However, the FCC ignored 
the microwave applications and concluded that "it is neither proper, 
pertinent nor necessary • • • to consider the specific lawfnl use \"Vhich 
the common carrier subscriber may make of the facilities of the car-
. ..16 r1.er. 
6 
The FCC's decision to remain uninvolved in cable television regula-
tion was short-lived due to the growing competitive threat that cable 
systems were posing for local broadcasters. In 1962, the FCC opened the 
jurisdictional door and asserten its authority in the Carter Hountain 
decision, 17 which placed restraints upon microwave common carrier facil-
18 ities that fed distant signals to cable television systems. The follow-
ing year, the Court of Appeals upheld the FCC's power to refuse licenses 
to microwave carriers in order to prevent serious economic harm to local 
commercial broadcasters. 
In April of 1965, the FCC issued a "Notice of Inquiry and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking" to further protect existine and potential broadcast 
services. The "First Report and Order" covered two main areas: (1) All 
cable systems using microwave to import distant signals were required to 
carry the signal of any station within approximately 50 miles of its 
system and, (2) Cable television systems were prohibited from duplica-
ting programming of local stations during a period of 30 days before and 
19 after presentation (this was later reduced to 15 days). The rule of 
local carriage, which became known as the must-carry provision, caused 
little concern because most cable systems were more than ~lilling to car-
ry signals of local stations. However, the 30-day provision caused 
"bitter protest" from cable operators for it limited the programming 
h ld f f h . d . i d . 2 O Th. 1 t ey cou o er on t e1.r 1.stant mporte stat1.ons. 1.s rn e, 
which later became known as syndicated exclusivity, meant that a cable 
television company could not carry a syndicated show on a distant sta-
tion if a local station had the contractual right to broadcast the show 
sometime within 15 days before the distant station was scheduled to 
21 broadcast the show. 
The "Second Report and Order" in March of 1966 represented the 
FCC's first comprehensive attempt to regulate cable television. More 
extensive regulation was viewed by the FCC as "necessary to neutralize 
the competitive threat and to contribute to its goals for the continued 
d 1 f f h . . .. 22 eve opment o ree, over-t e-a1r serv1ce. Specifically, the second 
7 
report reaffirmed the rule of compulsory carriage and the nonduplication 
provision of the first report and, in addition, introduced the following 
restrictions: (1) A cable television system may not import signals into 
the 100 largest television markets and, (2) The FCC desired to elimin-
ate or greatly limit the origination of programming by cable television 
systems but stated that it would ask Congress for legislation on the 
b . 23 su Ject. 
Soon after the FCC issued the "Second Report and Order" to en-
sure that cable television would not replace over-the-air service, its 
authority to impose restraints on the cable television industry was 
challenged in the courts. In 1968, Southwestern Cable Company filed suit 
against the FCC claiming that it lacked statutory authority to regulate 
h b f d . . 1 bl ld . 24 t e num er o. 1stant s1gna s a ca e system cou 1mport. Although 
the lower court decided that the FCC did not have jurisdiction over 
cable television, the Supreme Court ruled that the Communications Act of 
1934 authorized the FCC to take such actions which are "reasonably 
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various re-
sponsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." 25 This 
decision by the Court firmly established the regulatory view that cabl·e 
was a supplementary service to television broadcasting. 
In October of 1969, the FCC declared that "program origination on 
cable television is in the public interest" 26 and issued a rule that 
8 
required all cable television systems with over 3500 subscribers to ori-
ginate local programming by April 1, 1971. 27 In addition, the fairness 
and equal time provisions were made applicable to such broadcasting. Des-
pite the FCC's efforts to promote local programming ln areas where it did 
not exist, its rule was never enforced because many cable operators lack-
ed sufficient funds to obtain the necessary facilities, equipment and 
manpower to engage in local origination. In 1971, the FCC decided only to 
require that systems with over 3500 subscribers make equipment and chan-
nel time available to those wishing to produce programs. 28 This type of 
programming became known as public access. 
In 1972, the FCC issued its most comprehensive set of rules govern-
ing cable television. The rules set up standards of technical performance 
and reliability for cable systems, established minimum requirements for 
local franchising, and more closely defined the regulatory relationship 
29 among federal, state and local governments. For instance, basic-cable 
rates were determined to be under the jurisdiction of state and local 
governments while pay cable was deemed the responsibility of the FCC. In 
addition, the policy changed the "must-carry" rule from all stations 
within 60 miles of the cable television to within 35 miles plus other 
30 local stations viewed frequently by people in the area. Syndicated 
exclusivity also was reconfirmed and detailed guidelines were established 
regarding the importation of distant television signals. The guidelines 
were based on market size, location and the number of stations in the 
9 
31 area. In the area of franchising, four access channels became a require-
ment for cable operators in the top 100 markets: one for public use, one 
for educational purposes, one for government use and one for leased ac-
32 cess. 
Throughout the 1970s, the FCC steadily withdrew from cable televi-
sian regulation and left more of its jurisdiction in the hands of local 
municipalities. By 1980, the FCC had eliminated all franchising stan-
dards (except for the limit on municipal fees), the mandatory access re-
quirement and the syndicated exclusivity and distant signal importation 
rulings. Although few federal regulations remain intact, at least 40 
states enforce one or more cable laws, which commonly deal with franchis-
ing procedures, theft of services, pole attachments, taxation, or rate 
33 regulation. In all but a few states, however, cable operators also must 
negotiate with municipal authorities over the terms of the franchised use 
of public streets and rights of way. As a result, municipalities have 
attained vast control over the cable television industry. 
Although many attempts were made to pass comprehensive cable legis-
lation since the FCC began regulating cable television in 1966, the first 
national cable television policy statement was not enacted by Congress 
until 1984. "The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984"34 established 
policies concerning regulation, franchise operations, the promotion of 
broadband telecommunications and the maintenance of competition among 
franchises within the same area. Clearly, restraints on the cable televi-
sian industry remain despite the general trend toward deregulation. Cable 
television operators continue to have their First Amendment rights in-
fringed upon by federal, state and local governments in the regulatory 
areas of content, access and franchising. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIE\<l OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The review of literature was divided into three main categories: 
(1) regulatory background of cable television; (2) current regulatory 
framework of cable television at the federal, state and local levels of 
government; and (3) First Amendment interpretations, particularly those 
of the judicial system. This division follows. 
Regulatory Background 
First, an investigation into the regulatory background of cable tele-
vision seemed necessary to gain an understanding of the technology and 
the subsequent development of its regulation. According to author Don Le 
Due, "The basic nature of the interactions between the cable medium and 
its regulator should be revealed most clearly through historical perspec-
tive."1 Indeed, most of the literature available on cable television 
regulation focuses on the medium's historical relationship with the FCC. 
One of the most comprehensive publications concerning cable regula-
tion as a derivative history is Cable Television and the FCC: A Crisis 
2 in Hedia Control. Author Don Le Due examines the structure and opera-
tions of the FCC and identifies certain factors that have dictated the 
agency's attitude and behavior toward cable, as well as other technolo-
12 
13 
gical advances in the field of communications. According to Le Due, the 
public interest standard is frequently a contributing factor to FCC 
policym.aking: 
All federal regulatory decisions relating to cable have 
involved some variation of this single theme of public inter-
est, balancing the value of communications service furnished by 
the existing industry against the potential value in newer 
techniques challenging its predominance. Thus, a case history 
of commission deliberations weighing this factor seems to pro-
vide a unique perspective for determining whether a series of 
cable actions, each apparently justified in itself, might be-
tray in its totality a pattern of regulatory behavior consist-
ently sacrificing broader service goals to maintain industry 
stability.3 
Le Due further questions the FCC's competency to effectively regu-
late the communications media in this time of continuous technological 
change: 
The underlying question in determining whether a critical situ-
ation exists in communications control is not whether the com-
mission has consistently opposed change, but whether, operating 
in an era of communications revolution, it has retained the 
capacity to evaluate, rather than react instinctively to, chal-
lenge; and to formulate policy encouraging the maximum service 
consistent with its broad public interest mandate. 4 
Another book which focuses on the historical perspective of cable 
regulation grew out of a dissertation submitted to the Graduate School 
of Northwestern University by Hary Alice Hayer Phillips. CATV: A His-
tory of Community Antenna Television5 not only traces the regulatory 
history of cable television through time, but also provides a detailed 
account of the first cable system to operate in the United States. Phil-
lips recounts the first contact the cable industry ever had with the FCC 
and examines the development of their relationship through the early 
1970s. 
14 
6 The Cable Handbook, edited by Mary Louise Hollowell, is a compila-
tion of papers donated by experts in many areas of cable and new commun-
ication technologies. Legal expert George H. Shapiro contributes much 
valuable information in his paper titled "Federal Regulation of Cable 
Television." Shapiro presents a chronological and detailed account of 
FCC rules and policies that govern the cable television industry. In 
addition, he provides details on relevant FCC documents dating from 1959 
to 1974. 
The most up-to-date publication used by this researcher to gather 
information on the regulatory background of cable is The New Television 
Technologies7 by Lynne Schafer Gross. It traces the historical develop-
ment of cable television through the early 1980s and focuses particular 
attention on the actions of the FCC. Other literature on the regulatory 
background of cable television was found in journals, magazines, law 
8 reviews and other books. 
Current Regulatory Framework 
The review of literature on the current regulatory framework of 
cable television involved a review of federal standards established by 
Congress and the FCC and an investigation into the role of state and 
local authorities. The regulatory relationship between the federal and 
local government is based on a concept of "dual jurisdiction."9 "By this 
approach, the FCC manages certain aspects of cable regulation while 
local authorities handle others under the laws of their particular 
states. Author Steven R. Rivkin comments on the significance of the 
federal-local relationship: 
The growth of cable television impinges on the concerns of each 
major echelon of American government •••• This emergence of 
cable requires alignment of functions among governmental eche-
lons that will ensure both its growth and its responsiveness to 
public controls.10 
15 
The most comprehensive and up-to-date literature on cable regulation at 
the federal level was naturally provided in various government docu-
menta. The Code of Federal Regulations and the Federal Communications 
Commission Reports present extensive and detailed information on the 
rules and regulations promulgated by the FCC. The first national cable 
policy ever to be enacted by Congress concerning cable is the "Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984"11 (also ~nown as S.66). This national 
cable policy act established franchise standards as well as procedures 
and guidelines for federal, state and local regulation. Moreover, the 
legislation provided that competition in cable communications would be 
encouraged and promoted to assure the "widest possible diversity of 
information sources and services to the public." 12 
Aside from legal documents, a publication noted for its extensive 
coverage of federal regulatipn is Cable Television: ! Guide ~ Federal 
Regulations 13 by Steven R. Rivkin. Based on a four-year study conducted 
by the Rand Corporation, this book discusses, in depth, the cable tele-
vision rules adopted by the FCC in 1972 as well as other federal regula-
tions that apply to cable. A compendium of documents relevant to cable 
also is provided. Although Rivkin focuses primarily on the aspect of 
federal regulation, he also includes the role of state and local author-
ities in addressing cable's regulatory framework. Rivkin emphasizes the 
importance of an "intergovernmental" relationship, stating that a coop-
erative approach to cable regulation is necessary due to the "limited 
16 
resources of the federal regulatory agency and the familiarity of local 
governments with the particular social and economic circumstances pre-
'1' ' h ' 1 li i " 14 va1 1ng 1n t e1r oca t es. 
A more recent publication addressing cable television regulation is 
G. Kent Webb's book, The Economics of Cable Television. 15 Although he 
provides a brief but informative summary of federal regulation, Webb 
devotes most of his discussion to the regulatory role of municipalities. 
According to Webb, the municipal franchise agreement represents the most 
pervasive control over cable television. He further contends that muni-
cipalities have "circumvented the intent of the federally regulated 
limit on franchise fees." 16 
Another relevant book to grow out of the Rand Corporation study is 
Cable Television: Franchising Considerations. 17 This comprehensive vol-
ume edited by Walter S. Baer explores in detail cable technology and the 
issues of planning, franchising and regulating a cable system. With re-
gard to cable regulation as applied in this researcher's study, some 
specific areas discussed in this publication include signal carriage, 
allocation of channels, minimum channel capacity, facilities for public 
access, subscription rates and franchise fees. 
First Amendment Interpretations 
The search for First Amendment interpretations of the judicial sys-
tern naturally involved pursuing numerous legal reference materials. 
Among those utilized most frequently include the Supreme Court Reporter, 
Federal Supplement, U.S. Law Week and Federal Reporter. In addition to 




~Media and the Supreme Court, edited by ~enneth s. Devol, tra-
ces major Supreme Court decisions through 1981. Another collection of 
court decisions relating to the mass media is Marc A. Franklin's The 
19 First Amendment and the Fourth Estate. In the preface, Franklin states 
his book's primary purpose: 
To clarify the major legal doctrines that affect mass media, 
to explain their origins and asserted justifications, and to 
evaluate their soundness. In these efforts we focus upon the 
language of the Supreme Court of the United States, whose 
interpretations 8f the First Amendment provide the essential 
starting point. 2 
A third book, Documents of American Broadcasting, 21 edited by Frank 
J. Kahn, serves the need for a collection of primary source materials in 
the field of broadcast history, regulation and public policy. Aside from 
judicial decisions, other literature offers First Amendment interpreta-
tions applicable to the cable industry. 
22 In his book, The First Amendment Under Siege, Richard E. Labunski 
analyzes the constitutional situation of the electronic media in light 
of their status as enterprises licensed by the government. Labunski 
questions the extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of 
broadcasting: 
Almost no one argues that broadcasting should be totally un-
regulated. But contemporary debate centers on whether the 
federal government should be involved in matters other than 
the technical aspects of broadcasting, particularly decisions 
that affect programming and news content •••• Such regula-
tory policies as the Fairness Doctrine, personal attack rules, 
Equal Opportunity Doctrine, and other rules raise the most 
serious First Amendment questions. 23 
Although Labunski focuses on broadcasting, the arguments he raises 
also can be applied to the cable television industry. 
18 
The richest source of literature on cable television and the ~irst 
Amendment is CableSpeech: The Case for First Amendment Protection. 24 In 
this book, Philip B. Kurland, James P. Mercurio and George B. Shapiro 
focus on the constitutionality of current cable regulations. Kurland 
offers the following contention: 
There is no greater threat to freedom and democracy, no ~ore 
certain signal of tyranny, than government control over the 
communications media. Nor is it satisfactory to suggest that 
proposed invasions are only small ones. Any required obeisance 
by the media or any part of them as to what may be communica-
ted or how it may be communicated or when it may be communica-
ted is a dire threat to free and representative government and 
to freedom for the life of the mind.25 
As legal experts, these three authors present numerous judicial deci-
sions relating to the cable television industry. In addition to his 
literary contribution in CableSpeech: The Case for First Amendment Pro-
tection, Shapiro also addresses First Amendment issues in Current De-
velopments in CATV 1981, 26 published by the Practicing Law· Institute. 
Shapiro focuses on the constitutional significance of three different 
cases relating to the regulation of cable television. 
presents the opinions of the Court in Home Box Office, 
Specifically, he 
27 Inc. "J_. FCC, 
and FCC "J_• Hidwest Video Corp. 28 and also includes the proceedings of 
Cape Cod Cablevision Corp. "J_• Community Antenna Television Commission 
29 and the Commonwealth of tiassachusetts, which dealt with rate regula-
tion. 
Although numerous articles were utilized from law reviews and jour-
nals, the following articles were particularly relevant to this study. 
First, "Cable Television and the First Amendment,"30 published in the 
Columbia Law Review, examines the rationales that have been suggested to 
justify control over television programming stricter than that constitu-
19 
tionally permissible in other media and the applicability of these 
theories to a cable-based system. A second article, "Regulating Cable 
Television,"31 was found in the Washington Law Review. Nicholas Miller 
and Alan Beals analyze the .functional characteristics of cable and com-
pare them to characteristics of other media. In addition, they discuss 
the significance of these characteristics and distinctions in light of 
the First Amendment. 
Two articles focus exclusively on the constitutionality of govern-
ment mandated access to cable television systems. Although he departs 
from the underlying thesis of this paper in concluding that access re-
quirements are not inconsistent with the ~irst Amendment, Michael I. 
Meyerson's article in the Journal of Communications and Entertainment 
Law provides an in-depth exploration of the proposed classifications 
of the access requirement: a local regulation of a locality's public 
streets; as a regulation of a scarce communications medium; as a time, 
place, or manner restriction; as an attempt to encourage diversity in 
mass communications; and as an incidental restriction on the rights of 
32 the cable television operator. Meyerson contends that access rules 
meet the constitutional requirements of each classification. 
In another article, "Deregulation of Cable Television and the Prob-
d h Am d .. 33 lem of Access Un er t. e ~irst en ment, Robert A. Kreiss examines 
the interaction between cable systems and government, and the ~irst 
Amendment interests of three groups: (1) cable operators; (2) those 
seeking access to cable systems; and (3) the cable audience. In his 
study, Kreiss concludes that the constitutionality of access depends 
"upon one's view· of the underlying premise of the First Amendment. "34 He 
identifies one view as the "noninterference" premise: 
The First Amendment prevents government interference with com-
munication between willing parties, except in specified situa-
tions or where unavoidable •••• Under this interpretation 
the First Amendment requires that federal or state governments 
ensure minimum access to and diversity on cable systems.35 
A second view cited by Kreiss is: 
The First Amendment gives federal and state governments wide 
latitude in placing requirements on cable operators for the 
purposes of fostering discussion, exchanging ideas, and inform-
ing viewers. 36 
In summary, Kreiss' article supports the conservative view that the 
First Amendment provides constraints on governmental action. 
20 
An article in the Federal Communications Law Journal applies First 
Amendment analysis to cable franchising. William Owen Knox argues that 
the Constitution prohibits state and local governments from using the 
franchising process to choose who will provide cable service to specific 
communities. He further contends that the franchising process is "too 
broad for the justification upon which it stands (use of the public ways 
d . • ) .. 37 an econom1c scarc1ty • As for franchising contracts, Knox states 
that they are: 
Unconstitutional in and of themselves as they involve the limi-
tation of a constitutionally guaranteed right in exchange for a 
franchise. It is for the marketplace to determine which cable 
operators will be successful, not a government agency. 38 
Knox concludes that the cable television industry should be regulated 
according to the stricter First Amendment standards applied to newspa-
pers. 
One final publication to acknowledge is Cable Television: ~ Compre-
hensive Bibliography, 39 compiled and written by Felix Chin. This biblio-
graphy covers books, articles, studies and reports on cable television 
21 
published between 1950 and 1977. Some of the vast array of topics in-
clude history, regulation and policy, finance and economics, education, 
community control and franchising. Chin also presents a chronology of 
major decisions and actions affecting cable television, a list of feder-
al agencies and congressional committees dealing with cable television, 
and lists of the national, regional, and state cable television associa-
tions and the state regulatory agencies. 
Summary 
As indicated in the preceding discussion, literature on cable tele-
vision focuses on several different aspects of its regulatory subjec-
tion. Although reports and publications dealing with cable television 
began to appear in the mid-1960s, especially with the FCC's moratorium 
on cable growth in 1966, First Amendment issues were seldom addressed in 
literature until the 1970s. In the early days of cable regulation, the 
major issue seems to have been whether the FCC had authority to regulate 
cable, not whether certain restraints imposed by the agency were in vio-
lation of First Amendment principles. 
Although this variation of literature provides a strong background 
of knowledge on cable television regulation, it does not include a thor-
ough presentation combining elements of history, regulation and First 
Amendment analysis. This researcher already has acknowledged those few 
publications that have examined cable regulation in view of the First 
Amendment; however, such literature is limited in its regulatory scope 
and/or lacks a comprehensive, historical ingredient. Thus, the litera-
ture available suggests that there has been no previous study to address 
these aspects of cable television regulation in this specific manner. 
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Currently, cable television is subject to three content regulations 
that raise First Amendment questions: obscene or indecent programming is 
prohibited on channels subject to the exclusive control of a cable sys-
tem; cable operators must carry the signals of local and significantly 
viewed television stations; and the commercial speech of cable operators 
is restricted. In the past, the courts have made decisions regarding 
cable television content by using the broadcast regulatory model and, at 
other times, the print model. This chapter will discuss various rulings 
of the judicial system relating to content regulations and their appli-
cability to cable television. Moreover, the cable content regulations 
will be examined in view of the principles set forth by the 'l"irst Amend-
ment. 
Obscenity and Indecency 
The current standard used by the government to prohibit the distri-
bution of obscene material was handed down by the United States Supreme 
Court on June 21, 1973. In the ltiller ~·California case, 1 the Court 
defined the essence of obscenity as "offensiveness" or "repulsiveness" 
and formulated standards by which the states could constitutionally reg-
ulate obscene material without infringing upon the freedoms set forth by 
25 
26 
2 the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In determining whether material 
is obscene, the Court specified that the basic guidelines for the trier 
of fact must be: (a) whether ''the average person, applying the contem-
porary community standards," would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or des-
cribes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
3 lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. In 
concluding its decision, the Court referred to the guidelines as "care-
fully limited" saying that "no one will be subject to prosecution for 
the sale or exposure of obscene material unless those materials depict 
or describe 'hard core' sexual conduct • .. 4 
When the Communications Act of 19345 was enacted, it contained a 
passage forbidding the use of obscene or indecent speech in broadcast-
ting. In 1948, that ban was placed in the United States Criminal Code as 
follows: 
Whoever utters any obscene, indecent or profane language by 
means of radio communication shall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 6 
For many years this criminal statute has served as a guideline for poli-
cy in the broadcast area. Although the FCC has not established special 
rules and regulations implementing the statute, it has traditionally 
defined the limits of this statute based on "fact-specific" rulings of 
7 the Supreme Court. In several early cases, the FCC attempted to distin-
guish between what constituted indecent, as opposed to obscene, speech. 
8 
In the FCC ~· Pacifica Foundation case, the FCC issued an order 
banning a George Carlin monologue from the airwaves because it contained 
27 
"indecent" words that depicted sexual and excretory activities in a 
"patently offensive" manner at a time when children w·ere likely to be in 
9 the audience. Justifying its departure from the concept of obscenity as 
defined in the Miller case, the FCC offered the following explanation: 
Indecent language is distinguished from obscene language in 
that (1) it lacks the element of appeal to the prurient inter-
est ••• and that (2) when children may be in the audience, 
it cannot be redeemed by a claim that it has literary, artis-
tic, political or scientific value.lO 
The Supreme Court voted 5-4 to uphold the FCC sanction citing two "uni-
que qualities" of the broadcast medium to support its decision--its 
pervasive presence in the home and its unique accessibility to child-
11 ren. 
Although the court contended in the Pacifica case that "the broad-
cast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives 
of all Americans," its decision to limit the First Amendment protection 
f b d i b d i il h f "i . "12 o roa cast ng was ase pr mar y on t e concept o ntrus1veness. 
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens stated 
that broadcasting "confronts the citizen ••• in the privacy of the 
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs 
the First Amendment rights of an intruder." 13 He further added that 
prior warnings to unexpected program content did not fully protect the 
broadcast audience from being momentarily offended while tuning in and 
out. 
Dissenting with the majority, Justice Brennan criticized the intru-
sive nature ascribed to the broadcast media and claimed that the Court 
failed to recognize the ease with which individuals can turn off offen-
sive programming. Although he agreed that an individual was entitled to 
28 
be left alone in the privacy of his home, Justice Brennan contended that 
a person who chooses to listen to or watch broadcast signals does not 
employ all of his privacy interests: 
••• an individual's actions in switching on and listening to 
communications transmitted over the airwaves and directed to 
the public at large do not implicate fundamental privacy in-
terests, even when engaged within the home.14 
In concluding his opinion, Justice Brennan suggested that the 
limitations on individual privacy expectations were minimal when 
compared to the decrease in freedom of expression imposed by 
governmental restraints on nonobscene material that others may wish to 
h . 15 ear or v1ew. 
The second unique characteristic of broadcasting upon which the 
Court relied in Pacifica is broadcasting's unique accessibility to child-
16 ren. In the Ginsberg ~· New York case, the Court upheld a state statute 
that banned the distribution of material to minors which would not be 
judged obscene according to adult standards. Citing a legitimate govern-
mental interest in the well-being of its youth, Justice Brennan delivered 
the Court's opinion which endorsed state efforts to aid parents in shel-
tering their children from harmful materials: 
Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that 
parent's claims to authority in their own households to direct 
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our 
society •••• The legislature could properly conclude that 
parents and others who have this primary responsibility for 
children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws de-
signed to aid discharge of that responsibility.17 
Applied to the Pacifica case, the Court's rationale in Ginsberg ~· 
New York was to prohibit adults from receiving otherwise constitutional-
ly protected communications solely because children might be in the 
audience. 18 
?.9 
However, the Ginsberg case was based on a statutory prohibition that 
restricted (only) direct sales to minors of materials that were judge<i 
to be nonobscene to adults. As a result, the Court's ruling did not for-
bid the distribution of nonobscene material to willing adult recipients, 
nor did it absolutely prevent a minor from receiving the material if a 
19 
parent or guardian thought no harm would result. 
After Ginsberg, the Court reviewed its earlier decisions relating 
to obscenity and concluded that restrictions on the general distribution 
of communicative material could not be justified based solely on the 
sensitivity of children. 20 In the Pinkus v. United States case, 21 the 
Court reversed an obscenity conviction on the grounds that the trial 
judge had erred in instructing the jury to include children in its deter-
mination of community standards. The Court held that the inclusion of 
children was a '"reversible error'" and concluded that the '"average person 
standard'" would be substantially diluted if the presence of children was 
considered in determining whether the material is obscene. 22 Later, in 
the Butler v. Michigan case, 23 the Court reaffirmed its previous deci-
sions ruling that interest by the State in protecting children from non-
obscene material did not justify '"reducing the adult population • • • to 
d . 1 h . fit f h"ld .. 24 rea 1ng on y w at 1s or c 1 ren. 
As illustrated in the preceding cases, the government has tradi-
tionally taken an active role in regulating the content of various forms 
of expression. In Pacifica, the FCC applied its authority to regulate 
obscene and indecent material based on the Court's determination that 
broadcasting was intrusive and readily accessible to children. Although 
the Court identified these two characteristics as being unique to broad-
casting, the FCC broadened its regulatory authority to include cable 
30 
television and now prohibits the transmission of obscene or indecent 
material on those channels which are subject to the system's exclusive 
control. 
The federal restriction on obscene or indecent cable programming 
never has been tested in the various rulings of the FCC and never has 
25 been contested in the judicial system. Several state and local govern-
ments, however, have sought to ban certain types of cable programming on 
grounds of indecency. In 1982, nine states introduced bills which prohi-
bited the distribution of obscene or indecent material transmitted by 
26 wire or cable. Recently, the Utah legislature passed a ''Cable Televi-
27 sion Programming Decency Act" over the governor's veto. Although many 
state and local officials have attempted to regulate the communicative 
activities of cable television, operators claim that governmental inter-
vention is unconstitutional because it violates their First Amendment 
rights to speak freely. Thus, the authority of state and local govern-
ments to regulate the content of cable television programming has become 
a debated issue in the courtroom. 
28 In the Home Box Office v. Wilkinson case, national and local 
cable distributors and franchisees petitioned the United States District 
Court in Utah for an injunctive relief from a state statute making it a 
crime to distribute pornographic material by wire or cable. Applying 
First Amendment analysis, the court invalidated the statute, citing that 
it was "unconstitutionally overbroad" and that it "reached protected 
f f i .. 29 orms o express on. The district judge who delivered the court's 
opinion in this case also expressed his own belief that exposure to 
cable television programming is a matter of individual choice: 
There is no law that says you have to purchase a television 
set. There is no law that says you have to watch it. There is 
no law that says you have to subscribe to a cable television 
service •••• The greatest virtue of our system is freedom to 
choose.30 
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31 In the subsequent Community Television of Utah ~· Roy City case, 
the same district court ruled that a municipal ordinance banning cable 
transmission of "indecent" programming was "facially defective, overly 
b d d . i 1 "32 c. . h h d d d h roa an unconst1tut ona • 1t1ng t at t e or inance excee e t e 
First Amendment boundary set forth in the Miller ~· California case, 
Judge J. Jenkins also concluded that the Supreme Court's reasoning for 
regulating broadcast content in the Pacifica case was not applicable to 
cable television. In the Roy City case, the court identified several 
critical differences between cable and broadcast television, but empha-
sized the "appreciably expanded spectrum" of choice and viewing control 
33 that cable subscribers have over off-the-air television viewers. As 
noted in the previous cases, proponents of government regulation of 
"allegedly" indecent programming often rely on the Pacifica case to 
compare cable television and broadcasting. In Pacifica, intrusiveness into 
the home and availability to children were cited by the Court as reasons 
to regulate broadcasting content. Although the two characteristics may be 
applicable to broadcasting, the differences between cable and broadcast 
television clearly reveal that neither characteristic accurately describes 
cablecasting. First, cable television does not intrude into the privacy of 
the home. Subscribers voluntarily enter a private agreement to have their 
television receivers connected to the cable system and can, at any time, 
cancel or change service packages. In addition, cable television "isn't 
burdened by broadcasting's inability to protect the unwilling child or 
d 1 f . bl . .,34 a u t rom unsu1ta e programm1ng. 
32 
Lock boxes and addressability allow subscribers to further control the 
programming that enters the home. 
Another reason offered to justify local and state regulation of 
offensive cable programming is the "governmental interest in preserving 
local concepts of morality and indecency."35 Although the Miller~· 
California case established contemporary community standards to be ap-
plied in defining obscenity, the Court later determined it unconstitu-
tional for governments to suppress nonobscene expression in order to 
preserve morality. 36 In the Stanley ~ Georgia case, the Supreme Court 
stated that "governmental control of the moral content of a person's 
thoughts is totally inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amend-
ment."37 The district court judge in the Roy City case contended that 
cable indecency ordinances relinquish parental authority into the hands 
of the government and concluded that parents, not local government offi-
cials, are responsible to oversee the development of their children: "No 
police power or censorship can be a substitute for the moral function of 
the parent and the family." 38 
Aside from the strict limits established in the Miller v. Califor-
nia case, any governmental regulation of indecent material exceeds the 
bounds set for permissible action and is therefore unconstitutional. If 
content regulation is inevitable, however, the cable television industry 
could benefit if it received the same First Amendment protection that 
the print media enjoys; except for libel and obvious dangers to national 
security, the content of newspapers, magazines and books is completely 
protected. In a speech at the Western Cable Show in December 1983, Ralph 
Baruch, chairman of the board of Viacom International, Inc., compared 
cable systems to newspapers: 
Under the First Amendment, the newspaper editor decides--on a 
case-by-case basis--whether possible items for his pages are 
indeed obscene, and not fit for the community to see. On that 
premise, why is it not appropriate for the cable operator to 
judge what programs are deemed fit to offer to a system's sub-
scribers, so long as he takes into account the Supreme Court's 
definition of obscenity? 39 
Must-Carry Rules 
Despite its recent efforts toward deregulation, the FCC still re-
quires cable systems to carry the signals of local and significantly 
33 
viewed television stations. Specifically, cable operators must carry the 
signals of all licensed television stations within 35 miles of the com-
munity served by the cable system plus other local stations which, as 
shown by polls, are viewed frequently by people in the area. Television 
translator stations of 100 watts or more that serve the community also 
must be carried on request. The must-carry rules apply to all noncommer-
cial educational stations, as well as those stations serving communities 
in small television markets, that can be viewed by at least 50 percent 
of the television households in the market area. 
The must-carry requirement was one of the first restrictions impo-
sed on cable television systems. The FCC initiated the requirement in 
the Carter Mountain case40 when it refused to allow a microwave common 
carrier facility to transmit distant signals to a cable system unless 
that cable system agreed to carry the signal of the only local broadcast 
station. Mandatory carriage on microwave-served cable systems became 
official in 1965 and one year later, in 1966, was extended to include 
41 all cable systems. The FCC's regulatory justification for imposing the 
must-carry rules was to assign cable television the role of a supplemen-
tary service and to "get cable moving so that the public may receive its 
34 
benefits, and to do so without jeopardizing the basic structure of over-
the-air television." 42 
As indicated in the historical summary of cable television regula-
43 
tion, the Supreme Court in the Southwestern Cable case upheld the sig-
nal carriage requirement, citing that such regulation was "reasonably 
ancillary" to the FCC's regulation of broadcasting. The must-carry rules 
44 
were challenged again in the Black Hills Video Corp. ~· FCC case when 
cable operators claimed that such rules violated their First Amendment 
rights. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, failed to recog-
nize a First Amendment issue and concluded that cable's use of radio 
signals and its "unique impact upon the television broadcast service" 
necessitates regulatory jurisdiction on behalf of the public's inter-
45 46 est. In another case, Great Falls Community TV Cable Co. ~· FCC, the 
"public right to receive" standard was used to justify FCC rules imple-
47 
mented to protect local broadcast stations. 
One case in which First Amendment analysis was applied to cable 
television regulation was the Home Box Office, Inc.~· FCC case. 48 In 
response to the FCC's contention that cable was a secondary service to 
broadcasting, the District of Columbia Circuit Court held that: 
••• the Commission has in no way justified its position that 
cable television must be a supplement to, rather than an equal 
of, broadcast television. Such an artificial narrowing of the 
scope of the regulatory problem is itself arbitrary and capri-
cious and is ground for reversal.49 
The court criticized the regulatory decisions of previous cases which 
upheld the FCC's must-carry and nonduplication rules. It claimed that 
the cases tvere "incorrectly decided," stating that "physical interfer-
ence and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government" is inappli-
35 
50 cable to cable due to its abundance of channels and wire method. In a 
later case, the FCC undermined its previous rationale for mandatory car-
riage by recognizing cable as a "separate technology" that was neither 
" d f bli b fi "51 secon ary or in erior ••• in its pu c ene ts. 
The most recent case to challenge the constitutionality of the 
must-carry rules involved Quincy Cable TV, Inc. in Washington, D.C., who 
filed a request with the FCC to delete three television broadcast sig-
52 nals from its cable system in order to carry alternative programming. 
The chief of the Cable Television Bureau denied the request, citing that 
"the restrictions were necessary in order for the FCC to discharge its 
·b·l· . ..53 statutory respons1 1 1t1es. Quincy Cable then sought reconsideration 
of the decision, claiming that the must-carry rules "violated its First 
Amendment right to exercise discretion over the programming it offers to 
subscribers and its cable subscribers' rights to receive discretionary, 
d . 1 .. 54 nonman atory s1gna s. By the time the case was appealed and reviewed 
by the District of Columbia Circuit Court, three years had elapsed and 
Quincy had considerably expanded its channel capacity. As a result, the 
court held that the facts of the case were substantively incorrect and 
reversed jurisdiction back to the FCC which upheld the mandatory carri-
age requirement without further protest. 
Despite strong constitutional arguments against the must-carry 
rules, the FCC has taken no further action on the matter and the courts 
have yet to reexamine their validity. The rules, however, continue to 
"interfere with the editorial discretion of the cable operator and de-
prive the system of the use of a number of channels."55 Although the 
previous FCC rationale for regulating cable--that it is subordinate to 
36 
broadcasting--has been rejected by the courts, three other justifica-
tions that have traditionally supported the rules also fail to withstand 
First Amendment scrutiny. They are: (1) Competition from cable systems 
will undermine the FCC's policy of fostering the needs of local broad-
cast stations; (2) Cable competition will harm UHF and noncommercial 
stations; and (3) Cable operators unfairly compete with broadcasters in 
h . . . f . 56 t e acqu~s1t1on o programm1ng. 
The FCC originated the must-carry rules for the dual purpose of 
preventing economic harm to local broadcasters and to subsequently en-
sure that programming "responsive to local needs" was ])rovided to all 
communities. 57 However, the FCC has since abandoned its early rationale 
that local programming needs are only served by local stations: 
The premise that local needs can be met only through program-
ming produced by a local station has not only been rejected by 
the Commission ••• but it lacks presumptive validity.58 
The FCC further supported the above contention in 1979 when it reviewed 
a license renewal application for Community Television of Southern 
California. Although interest groups contested the license renewal 
application claiming the cable company was neglecting the needs of the 
community by spending a disproportionate amount of its income on nonlo-
cal programming, the FCC upheld the license stating that "national pro-
i d d 1 1 i d d i .. 59 I gramm ng can an oes serve . oca programm ng nee s an nterests. n 
1983, the District of Columbia Circuit Court held that the FCC's respon-
sibility in providing local programming extended only as far as its duty 
to grant licenses: " ••• as long as the Commission requires licenses to 
provide programming--whatever its source--that is responsive to local 
. • .. 60 commun1t1es. 
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In addition to reversing its contention that local needs and inter-
ests could be served only by local programming, the FCC has also recent-
ly begun to recognize that cable competition does not necessarily cause 
economic harm to local broadcasters. After conducting numerous economic 
analyses and case studies of approximately 160 broadcast stations, the 
FCC proposed the following conclusions: 
It is extremely unlikely that television broadcasters will 
experience any reduction in real income due to increased cable 
competition, audience diversion is likely to be low, and even 
if revenues actually declined there would be only a minor 
change in the quantity of public service programming from 
local broadcast stations.6 
Thus, the FCC has determined that repeal of the must-carry rules would 
have little adverse impact on local stations and noncable viewers. 
A second justification for the must-carry rules is that UHF and 
noncommercial stations would be harmed economically by cable compe-
titian. Although UHF broadcasting was viewed as "fragile" in the 
mid-1960s, it has since become competitive and no longer requires FCC 
protection. 62 In its Cable Deregulation Report and Order, the FCC noted 
that the impact on public broadcasting was difficult to ascertain due to 
a scarcity of financial figures; however, it maintained that a reduction 
in viewing hours of noncommercial stations did not necessarily indicate 
a reduction in viewer contributions or revenues for those stations. 63 A 
final justification for mandatory carriage is that cable systems unfair-
ly compete with broadcast stations in the acquisition of programming. 
This rationale for intruding into cable editorial judgments is also in-
valid. The copyright law enacted by Congress, which went into effect in 
1978, now requires cable systems to compensate program suppliers for the 
64 use of their copyrighted programs. 
38 
Clearly, all justifications to support the must-carry rules do not 
withstand First Amendment scrutiny. The rules substantially infringe 
upon the right of cable operators to use their own editorial discretion 
to determine the programming to be carried on their systems. According 
to George Shapiro, attorney at law, the rules are overbroad and impose 
unnecessary costs on cable operators: 
The rules are overbroad because they require the cable opera-
tors to carry all local signals regardless of whether the 
local signal is or would be economically affected by carriage 
on the cable system. Moreover, the cable system must carry all 
local signals even if the signals are readily available off-
the-air.65 
Such content regulations cannot be justified by any substantial govern-
mental interests or other compelling reasons and are, therefore, uncon-
stitutional. 
Commercial Speech 
One final area of content regulation imposed on the cable televi-
sion industry is commercial speech. When first confronted with the 
issue, the Supreme Court held in the Valentine v. Christensen case66 
that commercial speech was unworthy of protection. It rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution of 
"commercial ••• (or) business advertising matter" in the streets. 67 
The court stated that advertising, to be defined by looking at the moti-
vation of the speaker, was "pursuance of gainful occupation" rather than 
68 speech. This treatment of commercial speech was upheld years later in 
69 the Beard ~· Alexander case, when a magazine subscription organization 
challenged an ordinance prohibiting commercial door-to-door selling. 
Citing the question in the case as whether freedom of the press gave 
39 
magazines unique protection, the Court concluded that a seller of "gad-
gets or brushes" or "pots" could under no circumstances claim First 
Am d . 70 . en ment protect1on. 
71 In the New York Times ~· Sullivan case, the Court retreated from 
its earlier position and considered the content of the speech as opposed 
to the motivation of the speaker. The case involved a libelous adver-
tisement that was placed in the New York Times by a civil rights organi-
zation. Although the Court determined that the paper was motivated by 
purely commercial interests in running the advertisement, it said the 
publication "was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which 
the word was used in Christensen. It communicated information, expressed 
opinion, recited grievances, protected claimed abuses, and sought finan-
cial support on behalf of a movement whos·e existence and objectives are 
matters of highest public interest and concern."72 This content test 
73 assumed prime importance in the Bigelow ~· Virginia case, when the 
Court held that where commercial speech contained "factual material of 
clear public interest," the state's ability to suppress it would be 
weighed by the First Amendment interests served by the speech against 
74 the interests advanced by the regulation. 
In 1976, the Court moved into a new era with the Virginia State 
75 Board of Pharmacy ~· Virginia Citizens Council, Inc. case, and estab-
lished protection for speech devoid of any content other than the propo-
1 f . 1 . 76 sa or a commerc1a transact1on. A Virginia statute that prohibited 
pharmacists from advertising prices for prescription drugs was challeng-
ed by customers who claimed a First Amendment right to receive drug 
price information. Ignoring the Bigelow balancing approach in its deci-
sian, the Court upheld the First Amendment right of the consumers and 
40 
concluded that a state could not suppress truthful and nonmisleading 
advertising of legal products on the ground that the information would 
77 harmfully effect the public or the advertisers. 
In the Central Hudson Gas ! Electric Corp. ~· Public Service Commis-
78 sian case, the Court reapplied a balancing test to determine whether 
commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment Protection: 
••• it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental inter-
est is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, 
we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 79 
In a 1983 case, the Court identified a number of characteristics of com-
mercial speech and stated that such speech "is entitled to qualified but 
nonetheless substantial protection • .. 80 The Court also reemphasized 
that the government bears the burden of proving that a "substantial 
81 interest" exists when it seeks to restrict commercial speech. Although 
the cases thus far have dealt with all categories of commercial speech, 
First Amendment issues regarding the commercial speech of cable opera-
tors have been limited to the areas of cigarette and liquor advertising. 
In 1969, Congress enacted the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 
making it unlawful to advertise cigarettes on any medium subject to 
82 jurisdiction of the FCC. Two years later, in the Capital Broadcasting 
Co. 83 v. Mitchell case, broadcasters challenged the statute, claiming it 
was in violation of the First Amendment. The federal district court of 
the District of Columbia upheld the restriction, stating that it had "no 
substantial effect on the exercise of broadcasters' First Amendment 
rights "since they have lost no right to speak, but merely the ability 
to collect revenue from others for broadcasting their commercial 
41 
messages."84 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the "unique characteris-
tics of electronic communication make it especially subject to regula-
t . ..85 1on. Despite affirmation by the Supreme Court, the validity of the 
Court's decision in the Capital Broadcasting Co. case remains open to 
question since it was decided prior to Virginia Pharmacy and other cases 
86 that awarded First Amendment protection to commercial speech. 
Cases which have focused on state restrictions on liquor advertis-
ing have yet to establish how the First Amendment applies to such adver-
tising. In the 1982 Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commis-
sion case, 87 a retail liquor permit bolder challenged an Ohio regulation 
that prohibited permit holders from referring to price or price advan-
tage in their offsite advertising. Ohio law permitted all other forms of 
advertising by permit holders and also permitted manufacturers and dis-
tributors of liquor to advertise. Citing the Twenty-first Amendment88 
and a substantial state interest in controlling and discouraging alcohol 
consumption, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the permit holder's claim 
that the regulation violated its commercial speech rights. Later, the 
decision was appealed to the Supreme Court and dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court in the Capital Cities Cable, Inc. !· 
89 Crisp Case reversed the Tenth Circuit Court decision, which upheld a 
provision of the Oklahoma constitution and a related statute prohibiting 
off-site advertising of alcoholic beverages against a challenge by broad-
casters and cable systems who were thus prevented from carrying liquor 
advertisements. The Court concluded that Oklahoma's prohibition against 
cable television firms retransmitting out-of-state commercials for alco-
holic beverages conflicted with the FCC's preemptive jurisdiction which 
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requires cable companies to retransmit television signals. Upon review 
of the television case, th.e Court stated the following: 
• • • by requiring cable television operators to delete com-mercial advertising contained in signals carried pursuant to federal authority, the State has clearly exceeded that limited jurisdiction (allowed to the state by FCC policy) and inter-fered with a regulatory area that the (FCC) has explicitly preempted.90 
Departing from the Queensgate and Crisp decisions, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court advanced a different interpretation of the law concerning 
1 . f 1' d . . 91 A M' . . i h' 
content regu at1on o 1quor a vert1s1ng. ~ 1Ss1ss1pp statute pro.1-
biting the origination of liquor advertisements in the state was chal-
lenged by an advertising agency on the ground that it violated the First 
Amendment. Although the state asserted a substantial interest in con-
trolling the consumption of alcoholic beverages, the Court rejected the 
statute, claiming such legislation was "ineffective" and "remote" sup-
port for the state's purpose: 
• • • residents of Mississippi are exposed to so much liquor advertising from sources outside the state that the intrastate ban necessarily must have minimal effect on consumption and, hence, little effect on promotion of the state's asserted interest. 92 
As indicated by the conflicting decisions of the courts, content 
regulation of liquor advertising varies considerably, depending on the 
circumstances presented by each case. Thus, the current status of the 
law concerning the content regulation of liquor advertising on cable 
systems is unknown. 
Summary 
This chapter hopefully has demonstrated that content regulations 
·~3 
imposed on cable television exceed the bounds set by the First Amend-
ment. ~s illustrated, suppressing programs solely because they are 
thought offensive, denying cable operators editorial discretion in the 
programming they present, and banning commercial speech on cable systems 
even though the same content is conveyed to the public through the print 
media are all governmental restraints that have serious constitutional 
weaknesses. Regulating the content of cable television based on the 
regulatory models of the broadcast or print media fails to take into ac-
count the unique characteristics of the cable medium. In the Kovacs v. 
Cooper case, 93 Justice Jackson stated that various media deserve indi-
vidualized First Amendment standards rather than "oversimplified formu-
1 .. 94 as. Cable television should be no exception. 
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The cornerstone of First Amendment law is the Supreme Court's 
ruling in the Associated Press~· United States case. 1 In expressing the 
opinion of the Court, Justice Black wrote that the First Amendment 
"rests on the assumption that the wisest possible dissemination for 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the 
welfare of the public •••• "2 This view reflects the idea that there 
should be a marketplace of ideas, which, absent from governmental inter-
ference, would provide a diversity of expression in which all shades of 
opinion could compete for political or cultural acceptance. 
The trend toward concentration and centralization of the communica-
tions media, however, has presented economic and organizational barriers 
3 to entry into the competitive marketplace. As a result, commentators 
contend that some means of public access to these media should be devel-
oped in order to ensure a wide diversity of information and ideas. They 
argue that cable television provides a unique medium for the achievement 
of diversity and that mandatory access should, therefore, be required. 
As mentioned in the historical background of cable television regu-
lation, the FCC's original cable access rule required cable systems 
having 3500 or more subscribers to provide four access channels: one 
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so 
channel for public use, one for educational purposes, one for govern-
ment use and one for leased access. These rules provided the framework 
for a mandatory access prosram until 1979 when the Supreme Court invali-
dated the rules as beyond the Commission's statutory authority. 4 Al-
though several states have attempted to mandate access requirements 
after the demise of the FCC rules, mandatory access is almost exclusive-
ly the domain of local governments. Municipalities typically require 
access channels in franchise agreements by specifyins these and other 
requirements in "Requests for Proposals" when soliciting bids for cable 
franchises. 
Today, one of the few access requirements imposed by the federal 
government was established by Congress in "The Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984."5 The act requires cable systems with 36 or more 
activated channels to provide channel capacity for commercial use ("lea-
sed access") by unaffiliated third parties. 6 A final area of cable ac-
cess regulation at the federal level includes the fairness doctrine and 
equal time requirements imposed by the FCC in 1969. 
The imposition of these federal requirements or comparable require-
ments under state law or municipal franchises on cable systems raises 
serious First Amendment questions. Mandatory access not only affects the 
content of the cable system's communication, but also eliminates the 
editorial choice and discretion of the cable operator. 7 This chapter 
will focus on the constitutionality of imposing the fairness doctrine 
and equal time requirements on the cable television industry. Although 
the fairness doctrine relates more to content regulation than it does to 
access, it will be addressed in accordance with the equal time require-
ment due to the corollary relationship between these two provisions. 
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In addition, the editorial function performed by cable systems will be 
presented as an argument against mandatory access. 
The Fairness Doctrine and Equal Time Requirements 
In brief, the Fairness Doctrine has two parts: (1) All broadcast 
channels and cable systems with original programming must cover contro-
versies of public interest; and (2) Opponents of the presented views 
must be allowed time to respond. Written in 1934, the doctrine was de-
signed to reflect the public interest in receiving a variety of informa-
tion and ensure that a balance of opinions was provided over the public 
airwaves. The equal time requirement, on the other hand, specifies that 
cable systems must allow political candidates equal opportunities to 
purchase advertising time. 
The primary justification for upholding the fairness and equal time 
requirements for broadcasting is the spectrum scarcity rationale. In the 
8 1934 case, National Broadcasting Co. y. United States, Justice Frank-
furter addressed the spectrum scarcity issue in view of the First Amend-
ment: 
Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not 
available to all. That is its unique characteristic and that 
is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to 
governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, 
some who wish to use it must be denied. • • • Denial of a sta-
tion license ••• if valid under the Act, is not a denial of 
free speech.9 
Justice Frankfurter's holding was based upon the premise that the 
spectrum of frequencies available for broadcasting had an absolute lim-
it. Obviously, this opinion also relates to television (and, thus, to 
cable) spectrum space as well. Thirty-five years later, however, the 
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spectrum scarcity rationale was challenged after technology had permit-
ted a more efficient use of available spectrum. 
In the Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 10 v. FCC case, broadcasters argued 
that the increase in the availability of frequencies, compared to the 
declining number of daily newspapers, no longer justified FCC regula-
tion. In expressing the opinion of the Court, Justice White stated the 
following: 
Scarcity is not entirely a thing of the past. Advances in 
technology • • • have lent to more efficient utilization of 
the frequenct spectrum, but users of that spectrum have also 
grown apace. 1 
Justice White further maintained that as long as the number of potential 
broadcasters exceeded the number of available frequencies, the FCC had 
the power to grant and deny licenses: 
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government 
is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others 
whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the 
people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by 
radio and their collective right to have the medium function 
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amend-
ment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the 
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. 12 
The reasoning behind the scarcity rationale has been questioned on 
various grounds. First, the number of broadcast stations transmitted 
on "scarce" frequencies far outweighs the number of new·spapers. Today, 
there are more than 9,000 radio stations and 1,000 television stations 
compared to less than 2,000 daily newspapers. 13 Less than 40 American 
cities are served by two or more competing daily newspapers. 14 According 
to the National Association of Broadcasters, 97 percent of 80 million TV 
households can receive four or more broadcast stations, 67 percent can 
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d 38 . 10 . 15 receive seven or more, an percent can rece1ve or more stat1ons. 
There are currently 5,800 cable systems in the U.S., which serve some 
15,665 communities. 16 Another 1,939 franchises are approved but not 
built. 17 Clearly, numerical scarcity is not a distinguishing character-
istic of broadcasting or cable. 
Another contention in support of the scarcity rationale is that 
broadcast frequencies are scarce in relation to those who wish to com-
18 municate over them. George Shapiro disputes this claim: 
All economic resources, including resources used by print media such as paper and printing presses, are scarce in the sense that, absent some pricing mechanism, there would be a demand for a greater amount of the resource that exists. The government does not charge for broadcast licenses. Thus, pros-pective broadcasters are eager to brave the rigors of the FCC's allocation process, and it appears that there exists a great scarcity of frequencies compared to those who desire to use them. This same appearance would result if the government allocated, with no charge, printing presses and paper or any other economic resource.19 
Thus, Shapiro concludes that the nature of the government's licensing 
scheme prevents a valid comparison between the actual demand and avail-
ability of broadcast frequencies. 
Despite the alleged scarcity of the traditional broadcast outlets, 
technological developments in transmission and reception equipment has 
allowed for more use of the available spectrum. Some of the alternative 
forms of transmission include: cable, low power television, multichannel 
multipoint distribution systems, direct broadcast satellite and satel-
lite master antenna systems. 20 Aside from economic considerations, these 
new technologies promise to further reduce scarcity, if indeed it exists 
at all. 
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Regardless of the validity of the scarcity rationale to broadcast 
regulation, its application to cable television is clearly unfounded. 
Cable operators do not communicate with their subscribers by means of 
the limited electromagnetic spectrum. The FCC, however, found authority 
to impose the fairness and equal time requirements on cable television, 
not by application of the spectrum scarcity rationale, but by invoking 
bl " bl ill "21 i h " its jurisdiction over ca e as reasona y anc ary to ts aut or1ty 
to regulate broadcasting. 
To justify the imposition of the fairness doctrine on cable sys-
terns, the FCC stated in a 1969 report that "CATV operators have an obli-
gation analogous to that of the broadcasters to give suitable time and 
f bl n22 attention to matters o great pu ic concern. The FCC further main-
tained that the intended principles set forth by the fairness doctrine: 
• • • would be grossly circumvented if the CATV subscriber re-ceives both sides when he tunes his television set to a broad-cast channel at a time when broadcast program material is 
being presented, but only one side when he switches to a CATV origination channel or stays tuned to the broadcast channel at 
a time when CATV ori~ination has been substituted for deleted broadcast material. 
Specifically regarding the equal time obligations imposed on cable 
systems, the FCC stated that its responsibility for applying such a re-
quirement on broadcasting "would be largely thwarted if unequal oppor-
tunities were afforded on CATV channels." 24 
After establishing that it had statutory authority to require cable 
systems to abide by the fairness doctrine and equal time rules, the FCC 
dismissed all claims that the requirements were in violation of cable 
operators' First Amendment rights: 
We could not, consistent with our statutory responsibilities, 
permit a CATV operator to place broadcast signals in a setting 
of inequality, unfairness, and hidden sponsorship which could 
destroy the signals' integrity and defeat the purpose of the 
obligations imposed on broadcasters in the public interest. 
• • • no one has a First Amendment right to provide broadcast 
signals to the public in a manner contrary to the public in-
terest. Nor does the circumstance that CATV program origina-
tion may be economically dependent upon carriage of broadcast 
signals give rise to an indirect infringement of First Amend-
ment rights. If the regulation is so related, it is not barred 
by the First Amendment.25 
Although the fairness and equal time obligations were extended to 
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include cable television in 1969, the FCC has yet to enforce the affirm-
ative aspect of the fairness doctrine or the reasonable access require-
26 ment. In a 1975 ''Memorandum Opinion and Order," the FCC responded to a 
cablecaster's plea for reconsideration of the obligations saying that 
"We think it unwise to decide such a significant issue upon so sparse a 
d .. 27 recor • Six years later, the FCC's Cable Television Bureau reported 
that "there has been little detailed consideration of these laws, regu-
lations, and policies as they have been applied to cable television." 28 
One of the many arguments raised by cable operators, as well as 
broadcasters, is that the affirmative obligations of the fairness and 
equal time rules are not requirements of the print media. In the Miami 
Herald Publishing Co.~· Tornillo case, 29 the Supreme Court held that 
right of reply doctrines cannot be constitutionally applied to newspa-
pers. The Court held that the additional printing cost, the composing 
time and the use of scarce column space would hinder publishing. In a 
similar regard, Justice Tamm referred to the right of reply doctrines as 
"i 1 bl if li d h i d" .. JO nto era e app e to t e pr nt me 1a. 
Although no compelling governmental interest has been supplied to 
justify the imposition of the fairness and equal time requirements on 
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cable, the impact of these obligations "is considerably more intrusive 
h h · · b d . " 31 If h 1 d h t an t e1r 1mpact on roa cast1ng. t ey are app ie to eac separ-
ate channel, as originally determined by the FCC, cable operators could 
not meet the consumer demand for programming free of advertisements or 
editorializing. 32 The obligation under the fairness doctrine to provide 
balanced programming would severely limit cable's "narrowcasting" abili-
. hi h . il . . . f. d. 33 ty, 1n w. c 1t ta ors 1ts programm1ng to spec1 1c au 1ences. 
Content obligations also would hinder the transmission of textual 
services, which may, in the future, provide home delivery of news?a-
pers.34 As mentioned previously, the Miami Herald35 ruling prohibited 
government interference with newspaper content. It would seem likely 
that this ruling would apply equally to electronic print, making the 
fairness and equal time obligations unconstitutional as far as textual 
news channels are concerned. 
A final criticism of the fairness and equal time obligations is the 
limitations they impose on the editorial autonomy of cable operators 
regarding political advertising, controversial issues and other program-
ming decisions (the editorial function performed by cable systems will 
be further discussed in the next section of this chapter). In summary, 
the traditional justification for requiring broadcasters to abide by the 
fairness doctrine and the equal time provision should not be applicable 
to cable television. Although these rules have reportedly never been 
enforced against cable systems, they represent a serious intrusion into 
the First Amendment rights of cable operators. 
The Editorial Function of Cable Systems 
One of the strongest Constitutional arguments against mandatory 
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access is that it affects the content of cable communications. Mandatory 
access eliminates the cable operator's editorial discretion and control 
over programming transmitted on access channels. Shapiro addresses the 
constitutionality of governmental access requirements: 
As the Supreme Court has recognized in both the newspaper and 
broadcasting contexts, editorial judgment determines the con-
tent of a medium of expression. Ordering a communications med-
ium to publish or distribute programming selected by others 
operates in much the same manner as telling what it can and 
cannot publish. Such intervention into editorial decision-
making can be permitted only for the most compelling reasons. 36 
The editorial function performed by cable systems has been tradi-
tionally associated with the print media. Similar to newspapers, cable 
systems not only originate programming of their own, but also choose 
from a large number of available sources in order to offer a "package" 
of channels which will satisfy the interests and needs of cable subscri-
bers. In the FCC~· Midwest Video Corp. case, 37 the Supreme Court 
recognized these functions as significant to the editorial choice and 
discretion of cable operators: 
Cable operators now share with broadcasters a significant 
amount of editorial discretion regarding what their program-
ming will include ••• both in their signal carriage deci-
sions and in connection with their origination function, cable 
television systems are afforded considerable control over the 
content of the programming they provide.38 
The Court further identified mandatory access as a "comprehensive" 
threat to the journalistic freedom of cable operators: 
••• we reject the contention that the Commission's access 
rules will not significantly compromise the editorial discre-
tion actually exercised by cable operators. At least in cer-
tain instances, the access obligations will restrict expansion 
of other cable services. And even when not occasioning the 
displacement of alternative programming, compelling cable 
operators indiscriminately to accept access programming will 
interfere with their determination regarding the total service 
offering to be extended to subscribers. 39 
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As the Court recognized in its holding, even one access requirement 
on a single channel can have a substantial impact on the cable opera-
tor's decisions regarding the content of other channels. Although a 
cable system's total service package may offer a broad range of informa-
tion and entertainment, individual channels are essential in order to 
appeal to specific needs and interests of particular audiences. Accord-
ing to Shapiro: 
Each channel that is taken away from a cable operator because 
of an access requirement is one less channel available for 
programming the operator would select in order to best serve 
the demands of the community.40 
Despite the Court's recognition of cable systems' editorial func-
tion, advocates of mandatory access contend that cable operators merely 
act as conduits for the communications of others and, thus, are not pro-
41 tected by the First Amendment. Robert A. Kreiss explains the funda-
mental difference between an editor•and a conduit: 
The difference between an editor and a conduit is fundamental, 
and the Constitutional significance of that difference cannot 
be neglected. The traditional model of the First Amendment 
envisions direct communications between speaker and listener. 
The mass media involves a more complex situation; the media 
may act either as speakers or as conduits for the speech of 
others. To the extent that the media communicate messages 
themselves, or act as editors in selecting messages to be com-
municated, they are entitled to full First Amendment rights. 
To the extent that they act as conduits for the communications 
of others, however, the First Amendment does not protect their 
activities.42 
This characterization of cable as a conduit fails to consider 
that the lack of editorial control exercised by cable operators is 
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largely a result of deliberate governmental policies. Specifically, FCC 
regulations and some franchises require cable systems to carry certain 
broadcast signals without material degradation or editing (must-carry 
obligations). In addition, cable systems are forced to carry broad-
cast programs in their entirety based on provisions of the Copyright 
Act. 43 Cable systems also lack editorial control over access channels 
currently in operation because many of these channels are required as a 
result of franchising agreements or state laws. Thus, these restraints 
should not be used for justification of further governmental interven-
tion. 
Another contradiction of classifying cable systems as conduits is 
easily revealed upon examination of other media. Newspapers, for exam-
ple, frequently print syndicated columns and features over which the 
editor exercises little editorial discretion. 44 Also, newspapers act 
45 primarily as conduits for others when they carry advertisements. The 
government, however, does not take the liberty to control a proportion-
ate number of newspaper columns in order to ensure a diversity of views. 
In a motion picture context, the fact that a theater owner may choose to 
present material produced by another without editing it does not reduce 
the First Amendment value of the editorial judgment involved in making 
h 1 . 46 t e se ect1on. 
Clearly, the editorial function performed by cable systems is vital 
to the achievement of diversity in the marketplace. It is the cable 
operator's own economic incentive to appeal to a large number of inter-
ests in order to attract the largest number of different audiences. This 
economic incentive encourages cable systems to provide channels for pub-
lie access according to consumer demand. As one commentator observed: 
As more cable systems offer a greater number of channels, the 
probability of cable operators voluntarily providing public 
access channels increases. If access channels are not offered, 
it will more likely be due to the community's lack of interest 
in watching these programs than to the cable operator's refu-
sal to offer such channels. 47 
Thus, cable systems must be allowed to perform their editorial 
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function free of governmental intervention if they are to best serve the 
demands of the community. In the words of Shapiro: 
The editorial discretion of the cable television operator fos-
ters diversity • • • it therefore plays a vital role in the 
system of free expression contemplated by the First Amendmentft8 
Summary 
The most commonly cited rationale for mandating access is the broad 
claim that it protects the public interest. According to the National 
League of Cities, the foundation for this claim is that the public's 
interests outweigh the cable system's right of editorial control and 
49 free speech. Access requirements, however, have yet to be supported by 
a compelling interest. 
Cable operators should not be required, by any level of government, 
to communicate messages which the operator chooses not to communicate. 
Such requirements represent a serious threat to First Amendment princi-
ples. Mandatory access prevents cable systems from fully exercising 
editorial choice and discretion over the programming they offer to sub-
scribers. The fairness doctrine and the equal time provision similarly 
intrude into the editorial decision making of cable operators. 
Freedom of expression is vital to the marketplace of ideas. Cable 
operators should be allowed to operate in response to market forces 
rather than in accordance with "those who have no responsibility to 
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ensure the continued viability of the system and no accountability to 
subscribers." In the words of Gerald M. Levin, Vice President of Video 
Time, Inc.: 
• • • ideas take hold in this country through the marketplace 
of many media. And that's why cable can disseminate these 
ideas more widely and effectively than ever imagined.50 
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In the majority of states, municipalities have supervisory control 
over local franchising. In several states, however, the same state agen-
cy which regulates public utilities serves as the franchising authority. 
In a few states, separate agencies have supervisory control over local 
franchising but require state approval of franchises and franchise agree-
1 ments. 
The franchise agreement has been criticized on the ground that it 
intrudes on the First Amendment freedoms of cable systems. Cable opera-
tors typically are coerced by municipal authorities to make extensive 
promises for the authorized use of streets and public rights of way. 
According to Baldwin and McVoy, bidding for franchises has become so 
intense that "cable companies are promising services beyond tested tech-
nical capability at the time of application."2 Another commentator notes 
that a successful franchise bidder has done "nothing more than agree to 
limit his constitutional rights."3 
Although the negotiation of the cable franchise contract may itself 
be unconstitutional, other aspects of franchising such as rate-setting, 
franchise fees, services and other administrative controls have long 
been a First Amendment challenge to cable regulation. This chapter will 
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focus on the constitutionality of government officials charging fran-
chise fees, regulating cable subscription rates, and limiting the number 
of cable systems that can use public rights of way. 
Franchise Fees 
Cable franchise authorities ordinarily charge a franchise fee to 
cable operators for the use of public rights of way and to reimburse 
cities for the cost of repairing torn-up streets, redirecting traffic, 
and other costs associated with laying and maintaining cable lines. In 
1972, the FCC adopted rules limiting the amount of fees to three percent 
of the cable operator's gross subscriber revenues per year in order to 
4 prevent the assessment of unduly burdensome fees. Prior to the FCC 
rules) some municipalities were collecting as much as 36 percent of the 
5 cable operator's gross revenues. In 1977, the FCC amended the franchise 
fee rule by changing the revenue base from gross subscriber revenues to 
gross revenues of all cable services. 6 Recently, however, the provisions 
of "The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984"7 raised the federal 
ceiling on franchise fees to five percent, disassociated the fees from 
regulation costs and stripped the FCC of its power to grant waivers. 
First Amendment analysis of the government charging franchise fees 
or other economic equivalents was set forth by the Supreme Court in the 
Grosjean y. American Press Co. case. 8 The Court ruled that the 
government could not single out a communications medium for special 
economic regulation. 9 In the 1983 Minneapolis Star case, Justice 
O'Connor delivered the most recent opinion of the Court concerning 
differential tax treatment of the press: 
Differential taxation places such a burden on the interests pro-tected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such 
treatment unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest 
of compelling im~ortance that it cannot achieve without differ-ential taxation. 0 
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In the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 11 the Court held that a fee 
imposed by municipalities upon persons soliciting orders or delivering 
goods (for example, books and pamphlets) could not be levied against 
persons engaged in the distribution of religious literature. In affirma-
tion of its holding, the Court declared that: 
• • • the power to impose a license tax on the exercise of 
freedom is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down • • • a state may not 
impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right guaranteed by the federal Constitution.12 
Subsequent to the Murdock case, the courts consistently have held 
that fees imposed by the government on those who communicate under the 
public forum doctrine are limited to "nominal fee(s) imposed as a regu-
lation measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in 
i " 13 h ' b d d quest on. Moreover, it is t.e governments ur en to emonstrate that 
14 the fee is no greater than the actual cost of regulation. 
Despite the five percent ceiling on franchise fees, governmental 
authorities have been known to seek other forms of compensation from 
cable operators. In a 1974 "Report and Order," the FCC recognized no 
distinction between monetary fees and other forms of payment: 
Some franchises have required the cable operator, for instance, to wire each room in all the local public schools. This, in essence, requires the operator to internally wire the school system free of charge. Such an expense can be considerable, especially when several hundred rooms might be involved. The cost of equipment and materials alone could amount to more 
than the revenue derived from the franchise fee. It is this 
sort of indirect "payment-in-kind" that we are watching very 
closely and will not allow without justification. This type of 
expense is just as real and has~ust as much of an effect on 
the franchisee as a simple fee. 
Other forms of payment that have been demanded by franchising authori-
ties include special cable networks linking various governmental or 
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institutional offices, local studio facilities for programming and sub-
sidies to nonprofit organizations that seek access to the cable 
16 operator's system. 
In whatever form or condition, the franchise fee imposed on cable 
operators is constitutionally limited to that amount in which the gov-
ernment can demonstrate is necessary to cover the actual cost of regula-
tion. 
Subscription Rates 
In addition to franchise fees, the regulation of subscription rates 
also has been a topic of concern for First Amendment protection. In the 
past, one of the primary rationales for government regulation of cable 
television rested upon the assertion that cable television systems were 
natural monopolies and would, therefore, exact monopolistic prices from 
their subscribers if free of governmental restraint. 17 In 1981, local 
governments made the following argument in a report submitted by the 
National League of Cities: 
A cable operator, free of regulatory restraints, is likely to 
maximize profits by using his monopoly and monopsony powers. 
On the basis of his monopoly position, a cable operator can 
set the prices charged to subscribers for services largely 
free of all market constraints ?nd limited only by the consum-
ers' elasticity of demand.18 
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Despite the assertion that cable television is a natural monopoly, 
· cable operators claim they always have faced competition from several 
sources, including the market, consumer demand and the potential compe-
titian from other operating cable systems. Considering the competitive 
alternatives to the communication services offered by a single cable 
operator and the continuing influx of new technologies, the cable indus-
try contends that it is highly unlikely that "a cable operator could get 
the prices charged to subscribers for services largely free of all mar-
k · .. l 9 M h h bl 1 et constra~nts. oreover, anot er argument suggests t.at ca e te_e-
vision is not an essential service and, thus, its pricing cannot exceed 
the level which consumers are willing to pay for the services it offers. 
In view of the facts stated above, rate regulation cannot be justified 
on the ground that it is necessary to prevent the abuses of monopolistic 
power. 
Even in the absence of market competition, rate regulation of a 
communications medium violates the speech and press clause of the First 
Amendment. In the book, CableSpeech: The Case for First Amendment Protec-
tion,20 Shapiro addresses the issue of regulating the su~scription rates 
of cable television: 
Few would seriously contend that the government has constitu-
tional power to set the prices at which newspapers and maga-
zines are sold--even though many newspapers appear to have mon-
opoly power in their circulation areas. Since communication by 
cable television cannot be distinguished from communication by 
newspaper on any basis that would suggest a difference in the 
constitutional principles by which regulation of their rates 
and prices should be tested, there is no reason to apply dif-
ferent rules to cable television.21 
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In addition, Shapiro identifies three reasons why governmental control 
of the rates and prices of a communications enterprise, even with mono-
poly power, is inconsistent with the First Amendment: 
First, rates and prices can be controlled only if the product 
or service sold is also controlled. For a communications enter-
prise this product or service is communication, which cannot be 
constitutionally subjected to control by government. Second, 
regulation of cable subscriber rates, by its nature, prevents 
the cable operator from selling at least some, and perhaps all, 
of his communications at rates subscribers are willing to pay. 
Regulation of only the cable basic service may result in lower 
rates for some subscribers. If the prescribed rates do not per-
mit the cable operator to recover his cost for basic service, 
however, these low rates will require the cable operator to 
make up those costs by charging higher rates to subscribers who 
pay for the unregulated programming, thus interfering with the 
cable operator's freedom to communicate with these subscribers. 
Third, any scheme of rate regulation gives the government com-
plete control over the economic well-being of the regulated 
enterprise and therefore makes the enterprise subservient to 
the wishes of the government. A system of total rate regula-
tion, on the other hand, would curtail the ability of a cable 
operator to provide programming he wishes to provide, to expand 
his system in order to serve more viewers and increase the num-
ber of channels to enhance the diversity of programming avail-
able in the community.22 
As evident in the preceding paragraph, the relationship between govern-
mental regulation of subscription rates and the First Amendment has been 
heavily contemplated throughout the years. The recent enactment of "The 
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984," however, made rate deregula-
tion of all cable services an industry norm, after a transition period 
of two years in which some regulation will be permitted. Despite the 
strong regulatory nature of this provision, the new legislation in-
structed the FCC to promulgate rate regulation of basic cable service in 
markets where cable is not subject to effective competition. In addi-
tion, a five percent annual rate was granted to operators where basic 
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cable rates are regulated (i.e., during the two-year transition period 
or pursuant to FCC rules). 
Limits on the Number of Cable Systems 
Local governments in most states grant franchises that are nonex-
elusive in the sense that the city reserves the right to franchise more 
than one cable operator within the same geographic area. In a 1974 Rand 
Corporation report, the merit of granting only nonexclusive as opposed 
to exclusive, franchises was recognized: 
~11 in all, there is nothing to lose and perhaps something to 
gain by writing only nonexclusive franchises. If the operator 
is doing a good job, the threat of additional competition 
would be inconsequential, and the two types of franchises 
would have the same effect; but the potential threat of compe-
tition under a nonexclusive franchise would provide adrUtional 
stimulus for the existing operator to perform well. If worst 
comes to worst and he does a poor job, then competition would 
serve as a safety valve to protect public interest.23 
Despite the fact that the majority of franchises are awarded on a 
nonexclusive basis, over 99 percent of cable operators enjoy monopoly 
b f . 24 ene 1.ts. In 1981, the New York Times reported that there were only 
five municipalities that had granted franchises to competing cable com-
. 25 Th. 1 . . . . 11 d b f h pan1.es. l.S exc USlVlty 1s typlca y create y a ranc ising process 
in which local governments select one cable company from among several 
and make no further attempt thereafter to encourage or allow competi-
tion. 
Local government officials offer various justifications for allow-
ing only one cable system to serve their comrn1nities. Cable television's 
use of public property is one ground that has been asserted as a consti-
tutional basis for restricting the number of cable systems. Another 
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argument proposed by local governments is that they have the authority 
to deny permission to install a cable system in order to preserve the 
aesthetic quality desired in the locality. A final justification is 
based on the premise that cable television systems are natural monopo-
lies and therefore government officials may select the one system which 
'"best" serves the subscribers. 
Cable operators' use of the public rights of way for communicative 
activity is subject to the government's power to impose reasonable regu-
lations. The constitutional limit for such regulations was set forth by 
26 the Court in the Grayned ~· City of Rockford case: 
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, 
dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner 
that are reasonable." ••• Our cases make clear that in as-
sessing the reasonableness of a regulation, we must weigh 
heavily the fact that communication is involved; the regula-
tion must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legiti-
mate interest.27 
In view of the First Amendment, therefore, local governments may deny 
cable operators' use of public rights of way only if they can demon-
strate that the cable system cannot be installed in any way that is 
compatible with the normal activities on the rights of way the cable 
operators wish to use. In the words of Shapiro: 
In almost any situation imaginable, there are means available 
to reduce to tolerable limits any interference with public 
usage that the wires or their installation and maintenance 
would threaten. The local government's interest in preserving 
public property for its normal use, therefore, ordinarily can 
justify nothing more than reasonable restrictions on the manner 
and time of installation and placement of the wires and reason-
able regulations concerning their maintenance.28 
Despite Shapiro's contention, commentators have claimed that at 
some point in the future the abundance of cable wire eventually could 
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make the streets and sidewalks unfit for normal use. This consideration, 
however, does not justify allowing only one cable system to be inst~lled 
in a locality. According to the district judge in the City of Boulder 
case, 29 "While there are certainly finite limits to overbuilding (in-
stalling cable systems), those limits are something beyond two compan-
. .,30 1.es. 
The assertion that local governments may deny permission to install 
a cable system to preserve the aesthetic quality desired in the locality 
does not withstand First Amendment scrutiny. In the case of Metromedia 
Inc. v. San Diego, 31 a majority of justices acknowledged the subjective 
nature of aesthetic evaluation and concluded that any restrictions on 
communicative activity by employing aesthetic considerations must be 
" f 11 i . d "32 care u y scrut n1.ze • In the words of another commentator: 
Aesthetic judgments are the quintessence of subjectivity. 
Because of this fact, :reliance of a governmental body upon 
aesthetics to support decisions to limit the number of cable 
television operators can be accepted only with considerable 
caution. 33 
Aesthetic considerations should rarely suffice for justification to 
limit the number of cable systems in a community. Cable television wires 
can be run either underground or installed overhead where wire systems 
for telephone and electrical connections already exist. Cable wires 
would have little effect, if any at all, on the aesthetic quality of a 
community. 
The final justification for limiting the number of cable systems is 
based on the theory that only one system can operate in a given area and 
is therefore considered a natural monopoly. One reason proposed for a 
74 
single cable television operation is that one system can usually service 
a designated area at a lower cost to subscribers than could two or more 
systems: this condition is a result of the high fixed costs associated 
with installing a cable system in comparison to the variable cost of 
serving individual subscribers. 34 Physical limitations, such as the 
amount of space available on the poles or underground conduits, are also 
cited in favor of having only one cable system per community or sub-area 
of major cities. 
Evidence in support of these economic and physical limitations has 
not been substantiated. Moreover, the number of communities in which 
more than one cable system is operating has increased, indicating that 
35 cable television may not be an economic monopoly in many markets. In 
addition, physical limitations are no longer a valid argument for per-
mitting only one cable system in a locality. The technology of fiber 
optics represents an untapped market for distributing the programming 
36 and other services offered by cable. 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of A.ppeals declared that consti-
tutional rights are violated when a city allows only one cable system in 
37 an area that is able to accommodate more. This appelate ruling was 
reportedly the first in the nation to allow a First A.mendment challenge 
to exclusive city licensing systems. In the words of attorney Harold 
Farrow, the case was "The first clear and direct attack by the Courts on 
the use of the franchising process by municipalities to displace compe-
titian and probably the most definitive decision in the country now 
ff . bl 1" . " 38 a ect1ng ca e 1cens1ng. 
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Summary 
In light of First Amendment principles, various franchise regula-
tions imposed on cable operators should not be allowed. Beyond cable's 
use of public rights of way, there are few, if any, valid justifications 
for the government charging franchise fees, regulating subscription 
rates and limiting the number of cable systems that can operate in a 
given area. 
The constitutionality of the franchising process also raises seri-
ous First Amendment questions. Cable franchise authorities too often 
encourage or demand cable operators to surrender their First Amendment 
rights. Cable operators are subsequently in the "no win" situation of 
allowing franchise authorities to limit their constitutional rights in 
exchange for the privilege of a franchise. Although regulations are 
often negotiated and agreed upon by cable operators, they clearly repre-
sent an unconstitutional barrier to freedom of speech and the press. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Today, cable systems are serving more than 33 million homes in the 
1 United States. As a result of rapid technological developments, the 
cable industry now offers even greater service flexibility and transmis-
sion capacity. In the words of Channels of Communications editor Les 
Brown: 
Cable is a video cornucopia whose gifts include: a multitude 
of channels (upwards of a hundred in the most up-to-date sys-
tems); an abundance of national program networks; a potential 
for local public access; a range of interactive services from 
video games to home security; a method of information retrie-
val from data banks; an electronic equivalent of the depart-
ment store, and an ability to narrowcast to specific audiences 
as physicians and investment brokers.2 
Beyond being a television medium, cable also has the capability to serve 
as a communications network for an entire community. Cable systems can 
now link schools, libraries, hospitals, and police and fire departments. 
This significant growth of cable television makes it all the more 
important to reconcile government regulation with the principles set 
forth by the First Amendment. Despite its long-time comparison with the 
other media, cable television is a unique communications medium and 
should be treated as such for regulatory and constitutional purposes. As 
3 Justice Jackson stated in the Kovacs v. Cooper case: The moving picture 
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screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the 
street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses, and dangers • 
Each, in my view, is a law unto itself .. 4 Supreme Court Justice 
Frankfurter further criticized the use of "over-simplified" formulas to 
determine the constitutional protection of the various media: 
Some of the arguments made in this case strikingly illustrate 
how easy it is to fall into the ways of mechanical jurispru-
dence through the use of oversimplified formulas. It is argued 
that the Constitution protects freedom of speech: Freedom of 
speech means the right to communicate, whatever the physical 
means of doing so; sound trucks are one form of communication, 
whether by tongue or pen. Such sterile argumentation treats 
society as though it consisted of bloodless categories. The 
various forms of modern so-called "mass communications" raise 
issues that were not implied by Franklin and Jefferson and 
Madison. • • • Movies have created problems not presented by 
the circulation of books, pamphlets, or newspapers •••• 
Broadcasting, in turn, has produced its brood of complicated 
problems hardly to be solved by an easy formula about the 
preferred position of free speech.s 
Indeed, cable television offers its own array of regulatory and 
First Amendment issues. It should not be subject to the precise rules 
which govern other methods of expression. 
Conclusions 
This thesis has attempted to illustrate that various regulations 
placed on the cable television industry exceed the bounds set by the 
First Amendment for permissible government action. The government has 
taken the liberty to impose negative restraints on cable systems which 
affect the content of their communications, and subsequently eliminate 
their journalistic freedom to exercise editorial judgment. Such re-
straints include indecency standards, must-carry rules and prohibitions 
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against commercial speech. Affirmative restraints in the form of access 
requirements and franchising demands also represent serious ~irst Amend-
ment violations relating to the constitutional rights of cable opera-
tors. 
Although numerous rationales have been offered to justify these 
governmental restraints, few, if any at all, can withstand ~irst Amend-
ment scrutiny. Almost no one argues that cable television should be left 
totally unregulated. Much debate does, however, focus on whether the 
local government should involve itself in matters beyond its responsi-
bility of controlling the public rights of way, and whether the federal 
government should restrict the level of control it exerts over local 
cable operations. This researcher contends that most of the regulations 
imposed on cable systems would best serve First Amendment principles if 
they were determined by the marketplace rather than by the subjective 
views of governmental officials. In the words of one commentator: 
Allowing the demands of the marketplace to be satisfied by 
suppliers who operate free from government interference is the 
best mechanism known for assuring the supply of the goods and 
services a community desires. Time and again this fundamental 
law of human society has proved itself.6 
Clearly, cable operators must be allowed to speak and cof'lll1t.micate 
freely in the marketplace of ideas if the democratic principles of the 
First Amendment are to prevail. 
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